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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(A) Appel lee does not r e fu te the exis tence of fac ts tha t 
support Appellants1 theory. Appel lee 's claim tha t Sections 
4 1 - 6 - 6 9 and 41-6-73 a re not a p p l i c a b l e , and t h e r e f o r e 
Appellants requested in s t ruc t ion based on those s t a t u t e s was 
p r o p e r l y d e n i e d , i s u n s u p p o r t e d and has no m e r i t . 
Appel lee ' s absurd claim tha t the turn in question was not a 
l e f t t u r n was for t he j u r y to d e t e r m i n e . (B) Under 
Woodhouse v s . Johnson and Kusy vs . K-Mart Apparel Fashion 
Corporat ion, an unavoidable accident i n s t ruc t i on should not 
be used in o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s , and t h i s i s an 
ordinary negligence case . 
(A) Appellee confuses two d i f f e ren t object ions and ru l ings 
on jury se lec t ion in his Brief. Appellee c i t e s no au thor i ty 
in suppor t of h i s claim tha t Appellants ' object ions under 
Rule 47 were untimely. (B) Appellee misapplies the Sutton 
r u l i n g , which did not sanction the g r a n t i n g of more than 
three peremptory chal lenges to a s i d e . (C) The grant ing of 
excessive peremptories to defendants was p re jud ic i a l and the 
cases c i ted by Appellee are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . 
Appellee c i t e s to several cases without fac ts concerning a 
pol ice o f f i c e r ' s s t a t u s as an expert wi tness . Appellee does 
not explain how these cases are re levant to t h i s a c t i on , and 
no attempt i s made to r e f u t e or respond to the s p e c i f i c 
ob j ec t i ons to Officer Haggin's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and the lack 
1 
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of foundation for his opinions. 
4. Appellee does not substantiate his claim that the rebuttal 
testimony offered by Appellants was repetitive. 
5. The issue regarding counsel's comments to the jury is 
submitted based on the initial briefs. 
INTRODUCTION AND 
STATEMENT AS TO FACTS 
Appellee claims that the Statement of Facts in Appellants' 
Brief is argumentative, then proceeds to copy most of it almost 
verbatim. At the end is then appended what we maintain is an 
argumentative statement of facts related to each of the major 
issues. 
The facts relevant to the issues are discussed in each 
argument rather than separately attempting to refute the facts as 
represented by Appellee. The points in the argument correspond 
to each of the points made in Appellants' initial Brief and in 
Appellee's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A. APPELLEE ALLEN HAS NOT REPUTED THE 
EXISTENCE OP EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS 
APPELLANTS' THEORY OP THE CASE. 
Appellee does not take issue with the proposition that a 
party is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
the case if there is evidence to support it. Appellee bases his 
argument solely on the proposition that Sections 41-6-69 and 41-
2 
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6-73 do not apply to t h i s case . No attempt is made to refute 
tha t there was evidence p r e sen t ed t h a t suppor ted A p p e l l a n t s ' 
t h e o r y tha t the decedent not only stopped but tha t she entered 
the i n t e r s ec t i on when Allen was so far down the road tha t there 
was no immediate hazard. 
Appellee argues f i r s t , without discuss ion or c i t i ng a s ingle 
a u t h o r i t y , t h a t S e c t i o n s 41-6-69 and 4 1 - 6 - 7 3 "do not t a k e 
p r e c e d e n t over t he s t o p s i g n s e c t i o n and a r e t h e r e f o r e 
i napp l i cab l e . " (Appel lee 's Brief, p . 17) . We submit j u s t the 
o p p o s i t e i s t r u e . If a j u r y found tha t the decedent in fact 
stopped and entered the i n t e r s e c t i o n before Al len ' s truck was an 
immediate hazard, then the stop sign sec t ion was ful ly complied 
with by the decedent and would have no fur ther relevance to the 
issue of her negl igence, if any. 
Even if a jury found tha t decedent fai led to s top , the l e f t 
t u r n s t a t u t e s a r e s t i l l i m p o r t a n t in a s s e s s i n g A l l e n ' s 
negl igence , since i t is undisputed tha t the decedent was in the 
i n t e r s e c t i o n f i r s t , she was moving s l o w l y , and A l l e n was 
o b v i o u s l y confronted with an immediate hazard in h is intended 
path . The jury could have found tha t i t was Al l en ' s and not the 
d e c e d e n t ' s n e g l i g e n c e t h a t was the proximate cause of the 
c o l l i s i o n , or they could have a p p o r t i o n e d t h e n e g l i g e n c e . 
Without the l e f t t u rn s t a t u t e s to define Appel lee 's duty, the 
3 
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j u r y was d e p r i v e d of the s t anda rd upon which to make t h i s 
comparison. 
A p p e l l e e ' s second argument is t ha t the l e f t turn sec t ions 
are not appl icable because t h i s was not an i n t e r s e c t i o n "where a 
l e f t turn is being made". Testimony of an employee of one of the 
Defendants, Officer Terry, i s c i t e d . Almost everyone e lse in the 
t r i a l had no t r o u b l e r e c o g n i z i n g the t u rn as a l e f t t u r n . 
Appel lee ' s counsel , for example, referred to i t as such in h i s 
opening statement at t r i a l and in his own statement of fac t s in 
Appel lee 's Brief . ("He [Allen] a l s o l ea rned t h a t he had the 
r ight -of -way when he came through tha t l e f t t u rn . " R. 872, p . 
90; see also R. 973, p . 294). Appellee Allen cons ide red i t a 
l e f t turn and ins i s t ed tha t he be l ieves he gave a proper s ignal 
(R. 872, p . 112). The engineers who designed the i n t e r s e c t i o n 
with a l e f t turn lane and a l e f t arrow apparent ly considered i t a 
l e f t t u rn . Officer Haggin considered i t a " l e f t hand turn onto 
2 1 5 " . (R. 873 , p . 206). The d r ive r s of cars turning on the i r 
l e f t turn s igna l s at the i n t e r s e c t i o n , which were cap tu red in 
UDOT v i d e o s e n t e r e d i n to evidence , apparent ly considered i t a 
l e f t tu rn . I t i s a p l a i n l y obvious fact tha t i t was a l e f t t u rn , 
and the decedent was e n t i t l e d to consider i t as such. 
Unless t h i s court determines tha t t h i s turn was, as a matter 
of law, not a "turn to the l e f t " within the meaning of Section 
41-6-73, then Officer T e r r y ' s testimony i s a matter for the jury 
4 
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t h i s Court f u r t h e r affirmed tha t such an i n s t ruc t i on has been 
disapproved in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s and tha t such an i n s t ruc t i on 
" i s only to be used ' i n a rare case . . . . ' " 681 P.2d at 1237. 
The court in Kusy further s t a t e s : 
"The i n s t ruc t i on should only be given if the 
evidence could be in te rpre ted as showing tha t 
t h i s was an unusual and unexpected occurrence 
' w h i c h r e s u l t f s ] in i n j u r y and w h i c h 
happen[s] without anyone f a i l ing to exerc ise 
r e a s o n a b l e c a r e . . . . ' I d . " 681 P.2d a t 
1237. 
This i s an ordinary negligence case . There was no evidence 
presented of any unusual or unexpected occurrence which was not 
caused by a n y o n e ' s n e g l i g e n c e . Appellee has not attempted to 
r e f u t e t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . The i n s t r u c t i o n was c o m p l e t e l y 
inappropr ia te in t h i s case . 
Beyond t h a t , t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 37 
(Appel lants ' Brief, Appendix A) r e v e r t s to a d i s c u s s i o n of a 
d e f e n d a n t ' s lack of n e g l i g e n c e , not a lack of neg l igence on 
anyone ' s p a r t . This i n s t r u c t i o n i s m i s l e a d i n g . I t l i n k s 
unavoidable accidents with the absence of negligence on the pa r t 
of a defendant. 
This i n s t r u c t i o n is rou t ine ly submitted by defense counsel 
in ordinary negligence cases . We urge t h i s Court to forcefu l ly 
r e j e c t t h i s p r a c t i c e . 
6 
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POINT II. 
A. TIE J OR 1 BAD NOT BEEN SELECTED WHEN 
APPELLANTS1 OBJECTIONS WERE MADE TO THE 
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
The ^•t-\> r^ciri i~ i r e l a t e s to t h i s i s s u e I s a t t a c h e d a s 
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d ii s . I a t a! s t • i) t h e o t!: e r ( A p • i : • e ] 1 e e '* s 
B r i e f , • I - ^ u ^ : : ; a. d ii s t i n o t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o 
i s s u e s , T h e f I r s t ob j ec t i o n s were g r o und e d up o n Ru1e 4 7 an d ar e 
t h
 0 s e u n ( j e r r e v i e w . They • 3ea 1 t ; \?" ii 1 1 : i t h e e x c e s s I v e nI Imber of 
pe r e m p t o r i e s g r a n t e d to t'l le D e f e n d a n t s ai id t h e improper use of 
t h e pe r e m p t o r y r e s e r v e d f o r an a 1 1 e r na t e • Pai: t :>f t h e f i r s t 
o b j e c t i o n was s t a t e d a s f o ] 1 o w s ( p , 11 II • II 2 ii n Ap p e n d i x I i) i 
' " Mr. Deamer: your H o n o r , b e f o r e t h e j u r y i s 
announced and i m p a n e l e d and t a k e n t h e o a t h , I 
would l i k e t o i n d i c a t e f o r t h e r e c o r d o u r 
o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e number of p r e e m p t o r y [ s i c ] 
c h a l l e n g e s t h a t h a v e b e e n g i v e n t o t h e 
p a r t i e s 1 n t h i s m a t t e r . I b e l i e v e we 
d i s c u s s e d i t b e f o r e t h e p r o c e e d i n g s e v e n 
b e g a n . 
I r a i s e d a l so a1 I :>b j e o t l o i i under Rule 4 7 as 
t o t h e u s e o f t h e f o u r t h p r e e m p t o r y [ s i c ] 
c h a l l e n g e t h a t i t may o n l y be u t i l i z e d . . . i n 
t h e s e l e c t i o n o f a n a l t e r n a t e j
 u r o r . ™ 
(Emphas i s a d d e d . ) 
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"I would c i t e the court under the ru les to 
Rule 47-E t h a t d i s c u s s e s preemptory [ s i c ] 
c h a l l e n g e s and ind ica tes tha t each par ty i s 
e n t i t l e d to three preemptories [ s i c ] , except 
as provided in subdivis ion C. I be l i eve tha t 
was intended, together with subdivis ion Bf to 
i n d i c a t e t h a t the de f endan t s in t h i s case 
ought to s h a r e in t h e p r e e m p t o r y [ s i c ] 
c h a l l e n g e s ra ther than have four preemptory 
[s ic] chal lenges a p i ece . " 
The Court overruled those objec t ions as follows (p . 15 
in Appendix A): 
"The Court: I th ink , Mr. Deamer
 f Ifm s t i l l 
of the op in ion t h a t t h e y ' r e e n t i t l e d t o 
exerc ise them sepa ra t e ly , as long as t h e r e ' s 
d i f f e r en t t heo r i e s of l i a b i l i t y as to each 
defendant . They have cross claims or cross 
claims among the defendants . And under those 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I t h ink t h e y ' r e e n t i t l e d to 
each exercise t h e i r own preemptories [ s i c ] . " 
Counsel for Appellants then made a second object ion to the 
e n t i r e proposed panel under U.C.A. § 7 8 - 4 6 - 3 , which p r o h i b i t s 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in s e l e c t i o n of j u r o r s based on s e x . The 
Defendants exercised eleven of t h e i r twelve peremptory chal lenges 
a g a i n s t women and were proposing to exclude every s ing le woman 
who remained on the panel a f t e r chal lenges for cause (p . 15-16 
and 314-315 in Appendix A). Appellants are not asking t h i s Court 
to review the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ru l ing on t h i s second ob jec t ion , so 
the p a r t s of A p p e l l e e ' s Br ie f t h a t add re s s t h i s p a r t of the 
record are superfluous and p o t e n t i a l l y mis leading . 
Appel lee ' s incessant claim tha t Appel lants ' objec t ions were 
made af te r the jury had been "se lec ted" and " a f t e r the e n t i r e 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
p r o c e s s had, been c o m p l e t e d " i s s imol .- ^ -
V 
c • 
a • v> r> 
sworn,, 
. d J ' J '*- i 1 1 ST1 L 5 S : ' V 
" Aooe 11 ^e ! s Br I e f
 r 
-I 
it c e r e m p t ) r r j r - * h 
' h • o n a ^ Q . ** <• • -> o 
i " *" :. -^  --
pane" 
I " ^ 
1 
t . iv-': * 
and be" 
A 
p a s s i~. 
c w * 
f a t u o v 
i 
si tint : 
-'
 !
'» p p f '-<> h~i;~ 
- b j e - ^ • • * 
*" e 1 e r* t - - i 3 r n 
i * vl i t nq 1- c a s e 
- " I V V ^ * '* * O P ' 
n ^ A o p e f *) r e t hc 
-\ - - i 
o e r e ^ o t ' 
.t >j a . - e ^ 
! *s 
*• "^
 l
 hat 
• a r. o^ 
^ ; W « H ' 
wasted 'vv 
! ' V ? : t i SH:* . \ 
' I' r a " •• i -j 
s a l l o w i n - ; c~ ">m< •* f h per^mpto? .*h-i ^nqes 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had been taken a l r e a d y and c o r r e c t the s i t u a t i o n , " and he asked 
the Court to do so ( p . 12 in Appendix A). This would have taken 
about 20 m i n u t e s , s i n c e no j u r o r s had a c t u a l l y been s t r i c k e n or 
excused . 
I t i s p r o b a b l y i r r e l e v a n t to d i s c u s s what went on in the 
e a r l i e r o f f - r e c o r d d i s c u s s i o n s of t h i s i s s u e a t t r i a l , b u t in 
o r d e r t o a v o i d any p r e j u d i c e from A p p e l l e e ' s a r g u m e n t , we 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e f u t e A p p e l l e e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e was an off -
record "agreement" with the Court and among counsel to g i v e the 
d e f e n d a n t s four p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s e a c h . What a t t o r n e y 
p o s s e s s e d of h i s s ense s would agree to such a t h i n g ? No such 
agreement was a l luded to by e i t h e r the Judge or any of t h e o t h e r 
c o u n s e l . (See Appendix A) . We submit t h a t any such agreement 
e x i s t s on ly in t he mind of A p p e l l e e ' s c o u n s e l . The r e c o r d e d 
a r g u m e n t by A p p e l l a n t s ' c o u n s e l and t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g , both 
quoted above wi th r e l e v a n t emphas i s , s t r o n g l y imply t h a t the same 
o b j e c t i o n s were made and o v e r r u l e d in t h e p r i o r o f f - r e c o r d 
d i s c u s s i o n s . 
B. APPELLEE ARGUES FOR AN UNJUSTIFIED 
EXTENSION OF THE SUTTON RULING. 
A p p e l l e e m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e o p i n i o n in S u t t o n v . O t i s 
E l e v a t o r Company, 249 P . 437 (Utah 1926) j u s t i f i e d the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s g r a n t of 12 p e r e m p t o r i e s to the d e f e n d a n t s . In S u t t o n , 
t h e de fendan t e l e v a t o r company was al lowed only two p e r e m p t o r y 
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challenges because its co-defendant refused to join in the third. 
The Sutton court held that this denial of a third peremptory was 
prejudicial error because the co-defendant was in reality on the 
same side as the plaintiff and the elevator company was thus 
deprived of its three challenges allowed by statute. 
Appellee misrepresents the holding in the Sutton case, which 
was clearly one where the court was concerned solely with what 
"side" the parties were on. There is no hint in Sutton that any 
"side" would receive more than the three challenges allowed by 
the statute. It is explicitly not a holding that parties on the 
same "side" are entitled to more than three peremptory challenges 
because their interests are "adverse". 
Appellee's Brief contains no response to the language of the 
Sutton opinion itself quoted in Appellants1 Brief that the 
holding is a narrow one, nor does Appellee make any contention 
that any of the Defendants in this action were on the same "side" 
as Appellants. Appellee therefore seeks to have this Court 
ignore the language of Rule 47 and to misapply the Sutton case in 
a situation completely distinct. 
C. THE FACT THAT DEPENDANTS RECEIVED EIGHT 
MORE PERENPTORIES THAN PLAINTIFF IS IPSO 
FACTO PREJUDICIAL, AND NO SHOWING OF 
PREJUDICE IS REQUIRED IN UTAH IN ANY 
EVENT. 
Appellee contends that a majority of jurisdictions require 
that prejudice must be shown in order to reverse an improper 
11 
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g r a n t of peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . This i s not the law in Utah 
under the Sutton case , supra, where the Supreme Court held i t was 
p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r , without requir ing any showing, to refuse the 
proper number of peremptories . Even if a showing were requ i red , 
we s u b m i t t h a t t he r e c o r d on t h i s i s s u e shows s u f f i c i e n t 
p re jud ice . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s grant ing of 12 peremptories to the 
defendants affected the fundamental fa i rness of the t r i a l . What 
more could the P l a i n t i f f have shown? 
Most of the cases c i t e d here and in Appel lee ' s Brief are 
co l lec ted in 95 A.L.R. 2d 957 and Supplement. As i s there shown, 
the " m a j o r i t y " claimed i s ques t ionab le , and counted among the 
" m a j o r i t y " a r e c a s e s where an e q u a l number of e x c e s s i v e 
c h a l l e n g e s i s g ran ted to both s i d e s , as wel l as ca ses where 
excessive peremptories are granted but not used. Also, in some 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s where pre judice must be shown, pre judice has been 
found by nothing more than the grant ing of an imbalanced number 
of peremptor ies . Vargas v. French, 716 S.W. 2d. 625 (Tex. App. 
1986) (two defendants allowed 12 chal lenges and P l a i n t i f f only 
s i x ) ; S t . Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Welsh, 501 So. 
2d. 54 (Fla . App. 1987) ( d e f e n d a n t s allowed n i n e , p l a i n t i f f s 
a l l o w e d 3 ) . The c a s e s a re a l so much a f f e c t e d by the many 
d i f fe rences in the s t a t u t e s or ru le s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . See 
other cases c i ted in 95 A.L.R. 2d. 957, Supp. § 4 ( b ) ) . 
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When all of the distinguishable situations above noted are 
removed from consideration, there is clearly no majority position 
that excessive peremptories granted to one side must be shown to 
be prejudicial in order to be reversible. We submit that the 
opposite is probably the case. 
There are several jurisdictions, not just Colorado, where it 
has been held reversible error without any showing of prejudice. 
See Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 590 S.W. 2d. 875 
(Ky. 1979); Penaskovic v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 513 P.2d 692 
(Ariz. App. 1973); Mercer v. Braswell, 231 S.E. 2d. 431 (Ga. 
1976); Blount v. Plovidba, 567 F.2d 583 (1977, CA 3 Pa.). 
Most of the cases and other authorities cited in Appellee's 
Brief are distinguishable. Appellee first cites incorrectly to 
First National Bank of Miami v. Kerness, which is in actuality 
Bailey v. Deverick, 142 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1962). This case 
involved three plaintiffs and one defendant. Tt was considered 
harmless error that each side was granted nine challenges instead 
of three. 
In Thundereal Corp v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d. 923 (Fla. App. 
1979), cert. den. 378 So. 2d. 350, it was considered harmless 
error where each side was given six peremptories instead of 
three. 
Appellee's citation to State v. Evans, 612 P.2d 442 (Wash. 
App. 1980), reversed 634 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1981), is inapposite. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This case dealt with the propriety of granting a criminal 
defendant a peremptory challenge that he had previously waived. 
The case of Gee v. Egbert, 679 P.2d 1194 (Mont. 1984) is 
distinguishable because Montana has a statute that requires each 
party to receive 4 peremptory challenges. This has been narrowly 
construed by the Montana Supreme Court to mean an allowance of 
separate challenges only if the parties have adverse interests. 
In Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, cited in Appellants' 
initial Brief (p. 28), the Montana Supreme Court had said earlier 
that the determination of adverse interests should be established 
prior to trial. At two pretrial conferences, the plaintiff in 
the Gee case did not take issue with the claims of multiple 
defendants that they had adverse interests. 
Appellee avidly urges that this court specifically follow 
Wilson v. Ceretti, 210 N.W. 2d. 643 (Iowa 1973). This is the 
only case cited by Appellee where the erroneous granting of an 
unequal number of peremptory challenges was upheld because 
prejudice was not shown. This opinion has not been cited by any 
other court on the same issue in the 18 years since it was 
announced, not even in Iowa. 
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POINT I I I . 
APPELLEE MAKES NO SPECIFIC RESPONSE 
TO O F F I C E R H A G G I N ' S LACK OF 
Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S AND MAKES NO 
RESPONSE TO THE CLAIM THAT HIS 
O P I N I O N S WERE SPECULATIVE AND 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION. 
Appel lee has made no response whatsoever to the f a c t t h a t no 
f o u n d a t i o n was e v e r l a i d for t h e b a s i s of O f f i c e r H a g g i n ' s 
o p i n i o n s . No a t t empt i s made to r e f u t e the ev idence t h a t they 
were pure s p e c u l a t i o n w i t h o u t any b a s i s wha t soeve r . 
A p p e l l e e ' s B r i e f a d d r e s s e s o n l y t h e i s s u e of O f f i c e r 
H a g g i n ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . We have no p r o b l e m w i t h O f f i c e r 
H a g g i n ' s e x p e r t i s e in t r a f f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n and h i s a b i l i t y to 
t ake measurements a t the s c e n e . We ob jec ted s p e c i f i c a l l y to h i s 
o p i n i o n s on c a u s a t i o n and r i g h t of way. Appel lee does not r e f u t e 
t h a t Of f i ce r Haggin was not ab le to do the c a l c u l a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y 
to r e c o n s t r u c t the c o l l i s i o n a f t e r t r y i n g for many h o u r s f or t h a t 
he did not know the r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of t h e c a r s b e f o r e t h e 
c o l l i s i o n . He was o b v i o u s l y u n q u a l i f i e d to e x p r e s s o p i n i o n s upon 
the u l t i m a t e i s s u e s of c a u s a t i o n and r i g h t of way. The c a s e s 
c i t e d by A p p e l l e e a r e quoted wi thou t f a c t s , and no a t t empt i s 
made to demons t r a t e t h e i r r e l e v a n c e to the f a c t s in q u e s t i o n . 
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POINT IV. 
IT I S NOT TRUE THAT P L A I N T I F F ^ 
R E B U T T A L T E S T I M O N Y WAS A 
RESTATEMENT OF OPINIONS PREVIOUSLY 
GIVEN. 
Without a s i n g l e c i t a t i o n to the record to r e f u t e the f a c t s 
claimed in A p p e l l a n t s ' B r i e f , Appel lee makes the u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d 
c la im t h a t the r e b u t t a l ev idence o f fe red was s imply a r e h a s h . We 
submit t h a t Appe l lee m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e record on t h i s i s s u e . 
The q u e s t i o n s asked of p l a i n t i f f ' s e x p e r t a t t r i a l were in 
d i r e c t r e b u t t a l of e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e r t . 
Th is ev idence was heard for the f i r s t t ime a t t r i a l . The record 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y e x c l u d e d was n o t " s i m p l y a 
r e s t a t e m e n t of the o p i n i o n s Dr. Watkin had expressed p r e v i o u s l y " . 
( A p p e l l e e ' s B r i e f , p . 3 9 ) . 
POINT V. 
THE QUESTION OF THE PROPRIETY OF 
COUNSEL f S COMMENTS TO THE JURY IS 
SUBMITTED ON THE PRIOR BRIEFS. 
Thi s i s s u e i s submi t ted wi thou t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . 
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CONCLUSION 
A p p e l l e e ' s a r g u m e n t s on a l l p o i n t s r a i s e d in A p p e l l a n t s ' 
B r i e f a r e e i t h e r a b s e n t o r a r e n o t p e r s u a s i v e , and A p p e l l a n t s 
c o n t i n u e t o a s s e r t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t made a l l of t h e e r r o r s 
n o t e d . The e r r o r s were p r e j u d i c i a l / and A p p e l l a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d 
t o a new t r i a l , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 1 6 t h day of O c t o b e r , 1 9 9 1 . 
RANDLE & DEAMER, P . C . 
S t e p h e n R. R a n d l e 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s and 
A p p e l l a n t s 
5SBSRR.812 
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1 ARE SEATED TO BE SELECTED, THEN THE SEATS THAT ARE 
2 REMAINING WILL BE LEFT FOR SPECTATORS, WITNESSES AND 
3 OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES AND SO FORTH, ON A FIRST COME, 
4 FIRST SERVED BASIS. 
5 WE'LL BE IN RECESS. 
6 (RECESS HELD) 
7 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND 
8 GENTLEMEN. LET'S GO AHEAD IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN R. 
9 RANDLE AND OTHERS, VERSES UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
10 TRANSPORTATION, SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, AND CARL 
11 HUNTER ALLEN, #C-85-7216. 
12 COUNSEL, ONCE AGAIN WOULD YOU STATE YOUR 
13 NAMES FOR THE RECORD. 
14 MR. DEAMER: MICHAEL L. DEAMER AND GERALD 
15 UNGRICH APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
16 THE COURT: ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED? 
17 MR. DEAMER: YES, WE ARE. 
18 MR. PLANT: TERRY PLANT ON BEHALF OF MR. 
19 ALLEN, AND WE'RE READY TO PROCEED. 
20 MR. THORPE: JEFF THORPE ON BEHALF OF SALT 
21 LAKE COUNTY. WE'RE READY. 
22 MR. HENDERSON: BOB HENDERSON ON BEHALF OF 
23 THE STATE OF UTAH. WE'RE READY. 
24 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. 
25 THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE BEEN SUMMONED TO BE HERE TODAY AS 
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1 JURORS IN THIS MATTER, I'M GOING TO HAVE MY CLERK CALL 
2 YOUR NAMES AT RANDOM. WOULD YOU PLEASE COME FORWARD IN 
3 THE ORDER WHICH YOU'RE CALLED AND BE SEATED IN THE JURY 
4 BOX. 
5 (JURY SELECTION PROCESS) 
6 THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, 
7 I'LL READ THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO 
8 SERVE ON THE JURY. 
9 MR. DEAMER: BEFORE WE DO SO, MAY I BRING A 
10 MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE 
11 OF THE JURY. IF THE REPORTER WOULD COME IN CHAMBERS, 
12 PLEASE. 
13 (PROCEEDINGS REMOVED TO CHAMBERS) 
14 THE COURT: LET THE RECORD SHOW THAT COUNSEL 
15 IS PRESENT AND THE JURY IS NOT PRESENT IN A CONFERENCE 
16 BEING HELD IN CHAMBERS. MR. DEAMER. 
17 MR. DEAMER: YOUR HONOR, BEFORE THE JURY IS 
18 ANNOUNCED AND IMPANELED AND TAKEN THE OATH, I WOULD LIKE 
19 TO INDICATE FOR THE RECORD OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE NUMBER 
20 OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE 
21 PARTIES IN THIS MATTER. I BELIEVE WE DISCUSSED IT BEFORE 
22 THE PROCEEDINGS EVEN BEGAN. 
23 I RAISED ALSO AN OBJECTION UNDER RULE 47 AS 
24 TO THE USE OF THE FOURTH PREEMPTORY CHALLENGE, THAT IT 
25 MAY ONLY BE UTILIZED IN AN ALTERNATE JUROR IN THE 
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1 SELECTION OF AN ALTERNATE JUROR. AS I UNDERSTAND, THE 
2 COURT HAS INCLUDED THAT THE FOURTH PREEMPTORY MAY BE USED 
3 AGAINST THE ENTIRE PANEL. I ALSO WISH TO OBJECT ON THE 
4 RECORD AGAINST ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS BEING GIVEN THREE 
5 PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES EACH WHICH AMOUNTS TO 12. THAT 
6 EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED ALL WOMEN, AND TO THE EXTENT 
7 THERE'S A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN ELIMINATING ALL WOMEN 
8 FROM THE PANEL AND ALTERNATELY, WE THINK THAT'S SIMPLY 
9 NOT FAIR, I WOULD CITE THE COURT UNDER THE RULES TO RULE 
10 47-E THAT DISCUSSES PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES AND INDICATES 
11 THAT EACH PARTY IS ENTITLED TO THREE PREEMPTORIES, EXCEPT 
12 AS PROVIDED IN SUBDIVISION C. I BELIEVE THAT WAS 
13 INTENDED, TOGETHER WITH SUBDIVISION B, TO INDICATE THAT 
14 THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE OUGHT TO SHARE IN THE 
15 PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES RATHER THAN HAVE FOUR PREEMPTORY 
16 CHALLENGES A PIECE. 
17 I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO INDICATE ON THE RECORD 
18 THAT BEFORE THE PANEL IS FINALLY DESIGNATED, THERE'S AN 
19 OPPORTUNITY FOR THE COURT TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION BY 
20 DISALLOWING SOME OF THE PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT HAVE 
21 BEEN TAKEN ALREADY AND CORRECT THE SITUATION, AND I ASK 
22 THE COURT TO DO SO. OTHERWISE, IT'S SIMPLY NOT FAIR. 
23 IT'S A COMMUNITY INTEREST IN EXCLUDING ALL OF THE WOMEN; 
24 EFFECTIVELY ALL HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE JURY. 
25 THE COURT: MR. HENDERSON? 
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1J 
1 MR. HENDERSON: YOUR HONOR, I'M PREPARED TO 
2 ARGUE THIS DEAL ABOUT THE NUMBER OF CHALLENGES. THERE'S 
3 A CASE THAT BROUGHT ON THIS, A UTAH CASE, 1926 CASE, SET 
4 VERSES ELEVATOR (SIC), WHICH BASICALLY SAYS IF THE 
5 DEFENDANTS IN THE CASE HAVE ANY MATTER IN CONTROVERSY 
6 BETWEEN THEM THEY'RE EACH ENTITLED TO THREE. THAT SEEMS 
7 TO CONTROL TO ME. SOME OF THE THINGS THE COURT LOOKED AT 
8 IN THAT CASE ARE WHETHER THERE WERE SEPARATE ANSWERS. 
9 THERE ARE IN THIS CASE VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE ANSWERS, 
10 I.E., DIFFERENT DEFENSES. THERE ARE IN THIS CASE 
11 SEPARATE COUNSEL. THERE ARE IN THIS CASE ~ ALSO I POINT 
12 OUT, YOUR HONOR, THAT THERE ARE CROSS CLAIMS UPON THE 
13 DEFENDANTS. AND THAT CASE SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED THIS 
14 RULE MR. DEAMER REFERS TO AND SAYS THE CO-DEFENDANTS ARE 
15 NOT ON THE SAME SIDE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT RULE IF 
16 THEY HAVE THIS DIVERGENCE OR CONTROVERSY AMONG THEM. 
17 ALSO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK MR. DEAMER HAS 
18 WAIVED THIS. HE WAITS UNTIL WE SPEND AT LEAST TWO HOURS, 
19 MAYBE CLOSER TO TWO AND A HALF, BEFORE HE RAISES IT. 
20 THE COURT: OKAY, COUNSEL. 
21 MR. THORPE: I JOIN IN THE ARGUMENT THAT MR. 
22 HENDERSON HAS MADE THAT WE'RE EACH ENTITLED TO FOUR 
23 PREEMPTORIES. 
24 THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE 
25 FOURTH PREEMPTORY WAS EXERCISED AGAINST THE ENTIRE PANEL; 
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1 WHAT'S YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT? 
2 MR. HENDERSON: YOUR HONOR, IF HE BROUGHT 
3 THAT UP THIS MORNING, WHICH HE COULD HAVE DONE, THE COURT 
4 COULD HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FIRST 20 OR FIRST 25 
5 WERE THE JURY, AND THE NEXT FIVE WERE THE PANEL FOR THE 
6 ALTERNATE. THAT WASN'T THE WAY WE PROCEEDED, AND IT 
7 WASN'T UNTIL AFTER EVERYBODY EXERCISED THREE THAT HE 
8 RAISES THIS FOR THE FIRST TIME. I THINK HE'S WAIVED IT. 
9 MR. PLANT: ,1 WANT THE RECORD TO BE VERY 
10 CLEAR WE STATED THE SAME IN CHAMBERS THIS MORNING, AND IT 
11 WAS DISCUSSED AND MR. DEAMER WAS A PARTY TO REQUEST AN 
12 ADDITIONAL ALTERNATE; THAT IN DOING SO HE SAID THAT EACH 
13 PARTY WOULD THEN GET FOUR PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES. THERE 
14 WAS NO INDICATION THAT IT SHOULD BE SPLIT UP THE WAY HE 
15 WAS SUGGESTING; AND FURTHER, AS MR. HENDERSON POINTED 
16 OUT, IT WAS ONLY AFTER THREE CHALLENGES HAD BEEN 
17 EXERCISED BY ALL PARTIES THAT THIS WAS MADE, BROUGHT TO 
18 THE COURT'S ATTENTION. 
19 I'M WITH MR. HENDERSON ALL THE WAY. I THINK 
20 IF THERE WAS AN ISSUE THERE, IT WAS WAIVED. MR. DEAMER 
21 CERTAINLY HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AND 
22 HE DIDN'T. AND I THINK AT THIS POINT WE JUST GO FORWARD 
23 WITH THE WAY IT IS, AND THAT WOULD BE OUR POSITION. 
24 I WOULD ALSO JOIN IN MR. HENDERSON'S ARGUMENT 
25 AS TO THE NUMBER OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES ALLOWED TO EACH 
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1 DEFENDANT. 
2 THE COURT: I THINK, MR. DEAMER, I'M STILL OF 
3 THE OPINION THAT THEY'RE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE THEM 
4 SEPARATELY, AS LONG AS THERE'S DIFFERENT THEORIES OF 
5 LIABILITY AS TO EACH DEFENDANT. THEY HAVE CROSS CLAIMS 
6 OR CROSS CLAIMS AMONG THE DEFENDANTS. AND UNDER THOSE 
7 CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK THEY'RE ENTITLED TO EACH EXERCISE 
8 THEIR OWN PREEMPTORIES, 
9 IF THAT ELIMINATES ALL THE WOMEN, I DON'T 
10 KNOW, MAYBE THAT'S GROUNDS FOR AN APPEAL, MAYBE IT'S NOT. 
11 THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PANEL WAS DRAWN IMPROPERLY. 
12 THERE WAS NO SYSTEMATIC SELECTION THAT ONLY MEN WERE 
13 IMPANELED, SO THE PREEMPTORIES WERE CHOSEN SO THERE WERE 
14 ONLY MEN LEFT. THERE WERE SO MANY WOMEN ON THE PANEL 
15 DRAWN. 
16 MR. DEAMER: I MOVE THE COURT DISMISS THIS 
17 ENTIRE PANEL AND SELECT A NEW JURY FROM A NEW PANEL. 
18 THE COURT: ON WHAT BASIS? 
19 MR. DEAMER: SIMPLY ON THE WAY IT'S COME OUT. 
20 IT'S A WRONGFUL DEATH OF A WOMAN, BROUGHT BY HER 
21 CHILDREN, AND ALL WOMEN HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
22 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY LEGAL BASIS FOR 
23 THAT? 
24 MR. DEAMER: NO, OTHER THAN I'VE INDICATED 
25 UNDER RULE 47 IN TERMS OF FAIRNESS AND UNDER THE STATUTE 
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1 PERTAINING TO INJURIES. I'D CITE IT TO YOU IN JUST A 
2 MOMENT, IF I MAY. 78-46-3 PROVIDES, "CITIZENS SHALL NOT 
3 BE EXCLUDED OR EXEMPT FROM JURY SERVICE ON ACCOUNT OF 
4 RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN", WHICH 
5 PROVIDES "SHALL NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM JURY SERVICE ON 
6 BASIS OF THEIR SEX." THE STATUTE I'M LOOKING FOR DEALS 
7 WITH THE POWER OF THE COURT IN TERMS OF FAIRNESS, TO 
8 RECTIFY A SITUATION THAT'S COME UP WHERE IT'S NOT FAIR 
9 FOR THEM TO EXCLUDE ALL THE WOMEN FROM THE JURY OR EVEN 
10 THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ALL WOMEN JURY. 
11 THE COURT: ONE PROBLEM I GUESS I HAVE IS I 
12 CAN'T SEE WHERE THERE'S ANY INHERENT UNFAIRNESS TO THE 
13 PLAINTIFFS, OR SOME BIAS BECAUSE THERE'S NO WOMEN ON THE 
14 JURY. IF YOU COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME 
15 CLEAR BIAS AGAINST, OR PREJUDICE AGAINST YOUR CLIENT OR 
16 BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
17 WOMEN, BECAUSE THEY'RE ALL MEN, THEN THE COURT MIGHT 
18 CONSIDER THAT. BUT I CAN'T SEE WHERE THERE'S EFFECTIVELY 
19 A REMEDY. 
20 MR. DEAMER: THEIR CLIENT IS A MAN AND DEALS 
21 WITH AUTOMOBILE COLLISION; A WOMAN DRIVER VERSES A MAN 
22 DRIVER. THE MAN IS PRESENT IN THE COURT. AND A LARGE 
23 PART OF THE CASE IS THE DAMAGE ISSUE AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE 
24 AWARDED TO THE LOSS OF A WIFE, HOMEMAKER, MOTHER. AND 
25 WE — 
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1 THE COURT: THAT'S FROM A MAN'S POINT OF 
2 VIEW, HUSBAND'S POINT OF VIEW, THAT'S THE LOSSES TO HIM. 
3 MR. DEAMER: THE LOSSES TO THE CHILDREN, TOO, 
4 AND AS SEEN THROUGH BOTH THE EYES OF MEN AND WOMEN, IS 
5 JUST A MATTER OF BASIC FAIRNESS IS WHAT WE'RE TALKING 
6 ABOUT. 
7 MR. HENDERSON: JUST SO THE RECORD IS REAL 
8 CLEAR ON THIS, I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR WHY I EXERCISED MY 
9 CHALLENGES AGAINST WHO I DID, SO THERE'S NOTHING THAT 
10 APPEARS TO BE EVIL ABOUT IT. MY FIRST CHALLENGE AGAINST 
11 JUROR #10, CHRISTIAN ROBERTS, WHO WORKS AT NORDSTROM. 
12 THAT IN MY MIND — BEYOND THAT SHE WAS IN A THREE CAR 
13 ACCIDENT WHEN SHE WAS IN HIGH SCHOOL. HER BROTHER WAS IN 
14 A COMA FOR 3 MONTHS. THAT'S MY FIRST CHALLENGE. 
15 MY SECOND CHALLENGE WAS AGAINST A GAL WHO IS 
16 A SCHOOL TEACHER HAS ONE CHILD, BUT SHE'S NOT MARRIED. I 
17 DON'T KNOW HOW SHE GOT THE CHILD AND NOT MARRIED WITHOUT 
18 RESPONDING TO SOME OF THE COURT'S QUESTIONS, BUT SHE 
19 DIDN'T RESPOND TO SOME OF THE COURT'S QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW 
20 THAT CAN ARISE. AND THE OTHER REASON I CHALLENGED HER IS 
21 SHE'S A MEMBER OF THE UNION. 
22 #3 WAS THE TRAVEL AGENT. I HAVE A GENERAL 
23 DISLIKE FOR TRAVEL AGENTS. I DIDN'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR 
24 GOOD VIBRATIONS FROM THAT PERSON. SHE'S A MOTHER OF 
25 THREE CHILDREN, SAME NUMBER OF CHILDREN INVOLVED IN THIS 
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1 CASE. 
2 MY CHALLENGE #4, JACKLYN GELVIN, I DON'T HAVE 
3 ANY PARTICULAR THING AGAINST HER EXCEPT THE FACT IS SHE 
4 WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE INTERSECTION AND SHE INDICATED IN 
5 RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S QUESTIONING THAT A TWO WEEK JURY 
6 TRIAL WOULD BE A HARD DEAL FOR HER. AND THIS IS KIND OF 
7 HARD TO BELIEVE SINCE SHE WORKS FOR A.T.&T., THAT SHE'S 
8 THE ONLY PERSON IN THE OFFICE FOR A.T.&T. NOW, I WAS 
9 HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF THAT, AND IT LOOKED TO ME LIKE SHE 
10 WAS JUST TRYING TO GET OUT OF THE JURY DUTY, AND I DIDN'T 
11 WANT HER HERE ON THE CASE. THAT'S WHY I EXERCISED MY 
12 CHALLENGE AGAINST HER. 
13 MR. PLANT: THE COURT DOESN'T REQUIRE US TO 
14 INDICATE WHY WE DID OUR CHALLENGES. ONE OTHER THING, 
15 YOUR HONOR. IF TO THE EXTENT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL INFERS 
16 THAT THE JURY SELECTION WAS SOMEHOW DONE WRONGLY OR NOT 
17 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES, I WANT THE RECORD TO BE 
18 CLEAR IT WAS NOT. AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY POINTED OUT, 
19 THEY WERE SELECTED BY LOT AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES. AND 
20 I SEE NO BASIS TO HIS CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS SOME 
21 PROBLEM WITH THE JURY SELECTION. AND I DO NOT ANTICIPATE 
22 PUTTING MY REASONS TO THE RECORD FOR MY PREEMPTORY 
23 CHALLENGES. I THINK I'M ENTITLED TO DO THAT FOR WHATEVER 
24 REASONS I WANT TO. 
25 THE COURT: I GUESS THE ARGUMENT IS THE WAY 
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1 ITfS TURNED OUT IS UNFAIR, THE JURY PANEL IS JUST NOT 
2 FAIR- I'M NOT CONVINCED BY THAT ARGUMENT, SO I'LL DENY 
3 YOUR MOTION. 
4 MR- DEAMER: THANK YOU-
5 THE COURT: LET'S GO BACK -- YOU'VE GOT SOME 
6 ARGUMENTS TO MAKE AND MOTIONS TO MAKE. WE NEED TO TAKE A 
7 LUNCH BREAK. LET'S BREAK AND HAVE YOU COME BACK IN AN 
8 HOUR, 1:30 AND HAVE THE JURY COME BACK AT 2:00. 
9 MR. PLANT: I THINK YOU BETTER GIVE US AN 
10 HOUR. 
11 (PROCEEDINGS RETURNED TO COURTROOM) 
12 THE COURT: BACK ON THE RECORD. LET THE 
13 RECORD SHOW THE PARTIES ARE PRESENT WITH THEIR ATTORNEYS, 
14 THE JURY IS PRESENT. 
15 MEMBERS OF THE JURY, I'M GOING TO CALL THE 
16 NAMES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO SERVE ON THE 
17 JURY. WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND AS YOUR NAMES ARE CALLED. 
18 (SELECTED JURY CALLED) 
19 THE COURT: COUNSEL, IS THIS THE JURY THAT 
20 YOU HAVE SELECTED? MR. DEAMER? 
21 MR. DEAMER: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
22 MR. PLANT: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
23 MR. THORPE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
24 MR. HENDERSON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
25 THE COURT: THOSE OF YOU WHO WERE NOT 
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